The United States lacks a comprehensive, long-term strategy for China's re-emergence, which puts it at a significant disadvantage against China's methodical, long-range planning.
It is a strategic error for the U.S. to try to stop China's rise because its economic and social momentum is now irreversible.
American military engagements, especially in the Middle East, are a strategic gift to China as they divert U.S. resources, attention, and financial capital.
The most effective way for the U.S. to compete with China is to focus on its own domestic problems, specifically by improving the stagnant standard of living for the bottom 50% of its population.
Western expressions of concern over human rights in China, such as the treatment of Muslims, are widely perceived by the rest of the world as a political tool to embarrass Beijing rather than genuine humanitarianism.
1981
At the International Conference on Cambodia, Mahbubani observed the U.S. prioritizing its strategic need for China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union by siding with China against ASEAN countries, demonstrating a period of pragmatic alignment.
1993
Mahbubani personally witnessed President Bill Clinton warmly engaging with Chinese leader Jiang Zemin at the APEC summit, a stark contrast to his anti-China campaign rhetoric, which Mahbubani presents as evidence of past U.S. diplomatic pragmatism.
2003-2013
Mahbubani identifies this period, when the U.S. was militarily engaged in Iraq after ignoring allied advice, as coinciding with China's fastest period of economic growth, framing the Iraq War as a strategic distraction that benefited Beijing.
Trump & Biden Administrations
Mahbubani asserts that U.S. policy and actions against China have become consistently confrontational and have remained so across both the Trump and Biden administrations, reflecting a new, hardline bipartisan consensus in Washington.
▶US Strategic MiscalculationMay 2026
Mahbubani consistently argues that the United States lacks a coherent, long-term strategy for managing China's re-emergence. He posits that US policy is driven by a short-sighted domestic consensus to halt China's rise, a goal he deems impossible, and is further weakened by costly military distractions in the Middle East.
Analysts should be cautious of assuming US policy towards China is based on a stable, long-term strategic framework, and instead consider the influence of domestic political consensus and external geopolitical distractions on decision-making.
▶The Inevitability of China's RiseMay 2026
A central tenet of Mahbubani's analysis is that China's growth can no longer be stopped. He supports this by citing its success in lifting 800 million people from poverty, its ability to withstand US pressure like tariffs, and the return of its large traveling population as an indicator of domestic confidence.
Investors and strategists should operate under the assumption of a durable, powerful Chinese economy and state, rather than anticipating a collapse or significant reversal of its global influence.
▶Domestic Health as Geopolitical StrengthMay 2026
Mahbubani contends that the true competition with China will be won not with military hardware, but by addressing domestic weaknesses. He specifically points to the decades-long stagnation of living standards for the bottom 50% of the American population as a critical vulnerability for the US.
The long-term trajectory of US-China competition may be more dependent on domestic economic and social policy outcomes in the US than on foreign policy or military posturing.
▶Historical Precedent and Diplomatic Realism
Mahbubani frequently draws on his diplomatic experience, citing historical events like the 1981 Cambodia conference and the 1993 APEC summit. These anecdotes illustrate a pragmatic, interest-driven US foreign policy that historically accommodated China when it was strategically necessary, contrasting sharply with today's confrontational stance.
Understanding the historical flexibility of US-China relations suggests that the current confrontational consensus is not immutable and could shift if strategic imperatives change.