Keep pulling the thread on Eva Gonzalez-Isla.
A major blackout on the Iberian Peninsula left Portugal and Spain without power for upwards of 10 hours approximately one year ago.
The Iberian Peninsula blackout did not have a single trigger event, but was instead caused by a chain reaction from automatic protection systems.
After a five-year approval process, Spain has changed its regulations to allow renewable energy sources to participate in providing voltage control services to the grid.
On the day of the blackout, Spanish TSO Red Electrica manually switched 84 shunt reactors on and off between 9:00 AM and 12:30 PM, an average rate of one operation every 2.5 minutes.
During the Iberian Peninsula blackout, some dispatchable power plants that were expected to provide voltage support either failed to do so or exacerbated the problem.
On the day of the blackout, the basic voltage control systems used by renewable energy plants in Spain, which were compliant with regulations at the time, actually worsened grid instability.
Traditional regulatory models for European power grids are often based on capital expenditure (CAPEX), rewarding utilities for building new assets rather than optimizing operational practices.
The United Kingdom pioneered a total expenditure (TOTEX) regulatory model for its power grid, which is now being adopted by many other countries.
The transmission system operator (TSO), regulator, and power generators in Spain had inconsistent understandings of the applicable voltage rules, which hindered coordination during the emergency.
Spain's power grid has a regulatory exception allowing it to operate at up to 435 volts, whereas the standard European upper voltage limit is 420 volts.
Operating grid equipment in Spain at higher voltages than the standard 420-volt testing level reduces its lifespan and makes failures more unpredictable.
Spain began participating in the European 15-minute power dispatch market approximately one month before the major blackout occurred.