Keep pulling the thread on Wargaming The Pacific.
The U.S. Navy's excellence in decision-making during World War II was largely a result of wargaming at the Naval War College, which instilled a distinct style of analyzing the adversary's perspective first.
The primary U.S. war plan against Japan, simulated in Naval War College games through 1933, involved the U.S. fleet sailing west to relieve Manila after an initial Japanese invasion of the Philippines.
By 1935, United States military leadership, including General Douglas MacArthur, acknowledged that the U.S. fleet could not reach the Philippines in time to relieve defending forces in the event of a Japanese invasion.
Captain Van Orken's evaluation of a 1933 wargame concluded that the damaged U.S. fleet would be lost due to a lack of repair facilities in the Philippines, while the Japanese fleet could repair at its home dockyards, leading to a strategic U.S. defeat.
The evaluation of the 1933 wargame by Captain Van Orken was sent directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, leading to a fundamental change in U.S. war plans against Japan from a direct relief of Manila to a "step-by-step" island-hopping campaign.
In 1930, the President of the Naval War College provided analysis based on wargame statistics on aircraft carrier employment that directly influenced the design of the next class of U.S. carriers.
In 1924, Captain Harris Laning's testimony to the Navy's General Board regarding the performance of aircraft carriers in 1922 wargames led the Board to resume consulting the Naval War College for the first time since 1911.
Admiral William Sims, as president of the Naval War College, used wargaming data to argue that the United States received a disadvantageous deal in the Washington Naval Treaty.
Wargames at the Naval War College effectively taught non-aviator officers, such as Admiral Raymond Spruance, about the strategic use of air power, contributing to their success in World War II.
Wargames in 1933 supported Admiral Ernest King's concept of separating the aircraft carrier force from the main battleship fleet, a key doctrinal shift that established the carrier as a primary naval weapon system in World War II.
On December 5, 1941, Rear Admiral Chester Nimitz stated that a Naval War College education enabled officers to think similarly about problems, allowing them to operate independently while executing a general plan in a distributed manner.
Pre-World War II wargames demonstrated that U.S. submarines operating against Japan under restricted rules of engagement would not be survivable, implying the necessity of an unrestricted submarine warfare campaign.