Michael Kofman

Military analyst specializing in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Claims

As speaker

Mentioned in

Key positions and views

Vladimir Putin was intent on war from the outset of negotiations in 2021, rendering diplomacy a formality.

The United States plays an indispensable and currently irreplaceable role in arming Ukraine, particularly with unique air defense and precision munitions.

Russia's war effort is under immense economic strain, with 40% of its government budget dedicated to the conflict, and is vulnerable to low oil prices.

The war is a dynamic stalemate defined by mutual adaptation, with both Russia and Ukraine evolving their tactics, particularly in the realm of drone warfare.

A potential Trump administration's policy is contradictory, aiming for a rapid end to the war while shifting security burdens to a currently unprepared Europe.

Podcast consensus on Kofman

Points of consensus

▶Russia's military advantages are not decisive, and its campaign has been hampered by failures like not collapsing the Ukrainian military and struggling to sustain casualty rates that match recruitment.Apr 2026

▶The United States' role is critical and irreplaceable for Ukraine's defense, providing unique capabilities like specific air defense interceptors and coordinating international aid, a role European nations cannot currently fill.Apr 2026

▶The economics of the war are a significant constraint on Russia, which is spending a massive portion of its GDP (8%) and government budget (40%) on the conflict while being hurt by low oil prices.Apr 2026

▶Drone warfare is a key area of adaptation for both sides, with Ukraine expanding interceptor and strike drones while Russia expands its own elite drone units to achieve parity.Apr 2026

Points of debate

▶Kofman highlights a core contradiction in the Trump administration's stated policy: simultaneously reducing the U.S. military commitment to Europe while increasing the security commitment to Ukraine.Apr 2026

▶He points to internal Ukrainian strategic debates, citing former Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhnyi's claim that political leadership overruled his military preference to concentrate forces during the 2023 offensive.Apr 2026

▶Kofman notes a disconnect between Russian military reality and political reporting, with military leaders misrepresenting battlefield performance to the political leadership throughout 2025.Apr 2026

▶He contrasts the Biden administration's initial caution due to escalation fears, which delayed aid, with the current reality of deep U.S. involvement and coordination of security assistance.

Key themes

▶Russian Military Strain and AdaptationApr 2026

Kofman argues that while Russia retains battlefield advantages, its military is under severe pressure. It faces unsustainable casualty rates, economic constraints, and has failed in its key bet to collapse the Ukrainian military, forcing tactical shifts towards small infantry groups and drone warfare.

Analysts should monitor Russia's recruitment numbers versus casualty rates and its GDP allocation to defense as leading indicators of its capacity to sustain offensive operations.

▶The Indispensable Role of US AidApr 2026

Kofman emphasizes that the United States is the sole provider of critical military capabilities for Ukraine, such as specific air defense interceptors and precision munitions. He asserts that European nations are not yet capable of filling this gap, making continued US support a decisive factor in the war's trajectory.

Any fluctuation in US political will or aid packages, especially concerning unique systems, directly impacts Ukraine's ability to defend its territory and presents a significant risk factor for investors in the region.

▶Ukrainian Strategic Innovation and Asymmetric WarfareApr 2026

The analysis highlights Ukraine's adaptability in the face of Russian aggression. Kofman points to Ukraine's expansion of drone production for both defense and offense, and its new campaign of unrestricted warfare against Russia's 'shadow fleet' of oil tankers.

Ukraine's focus on asymmetric tactics, particularly targeting Russia's economic lifelines like oil exports, suggests a strategy to impose costs far beyond the battlefield, which could create volatility in global energy markets.

▶US Political Division and European SecurityApr 2026

Kofman scrutinizes the differing approaches of the Biden and Trump administrations. He notes the Biden team's initial hesitancy due to escalation fears and the Trump team's contradictory policy of reducing US presence while aiming to quickly end the war and shift security burdens to an unprepared Europe.

The outcome of US elections represents a major geopolitical variable; a policy shift towards burden-sharing could force a rapid, and potentially disorderly, increase in European defense spending and integration.

Source episodes

Sentiment over time

Not enough data for timeline

Changes over time

2021

Asserts that Vladimir Putin intended to invade Ukraine from the outset of negotiations, issuing ultimatums to that effect.

First months of the war

Notes that the Biden administration's exaggerated fears of escalation risk delayed the transfer of key military capabilities to Ukraine by several months.

Summer 2023

Highlights a major strategic disagreement within Ukraine's leadership, where Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhnyi was allegedly forced by political leaders to split his offensive forces against his military advice.

Throughout 2025 (Projected)

Describes a scenario where Russian military leadership consistently misreports battlefield successes to the political leadership.

Fall/Winter 2025 (Projected)

Projects a turning point where Russia's irrecoverable casualty rate begins to match its recruitment rate, halting its ability to expand its forces.

End of 2025 (Projected)

Foresees the Russian military achieving parity with Ukraine in drone warfare through significant qualitative and quantitative improvements.

Suggested prompts

How would a shift in US policy towards European burden-sharing realistically impact Ukraine's defense capabilities in the next 24 months, given Kofman's assessment of Europe's current readiness? &nearr;What are the primary indicators that would validate or invalidate Kofman's projection that Russia's casualty rates will neutralize its recruitment efforts by late 2025? &nearr;Based on Kofman's analysis of Ukraine's asymmetric campaign against Russia's 'shadow fleet,' what are the potential secondary effects on global energy markets and maritime insurance? &nearr;How does the internal strategic disagreement between Ukrainian military and political leadership, as described by Kofman, affect the long-term planning and effectiveness of Western military aid? &nearr;

Key concepts

Russian Military Strategy 1 ep US Foreign Policy (Ukraine) 1 ep Ukrainian Military Adaptation 1 ep Drone Warfare 1 ep War Economy (Russia) 1 ep Trump Administration Policy 1 ep European Security Burden-Sharing 1 ep International Military Aid 1 ep Asymmetric Warfare 1 ep Information Warfare (Russia) 1 ep

Notable quotes

“Putin wanted the war, okay? He wanted the war from the very outset, during the negotiations in 2021, and the ultimatums he issued.”

Michael Kofman · Michael Kofman: Is There an Endgame in Ukraine? | Foreign Affairs Interview

“it's a real question how long can they sustain budgetary outlays of 40% of the government budget being spent on this war at about 8% of GDP”

Michael Kofman · Michael Kofman: Is There an Endgame in Ukraine? | Foreign Affairs Interview

“you see criticism from Valerius Ellusion, the previous commander in chief, essentially claiming that in the big offensive of summer 2023, he wanted to concentrate forces along one axis and those political leadership that forced him to split the force three ways.”

Michael Kofman · Michael Kofman: Is There an Endgame in Ukraine? | Foreign Affairs Interview

“The United States is the sole provider of certain air defense interceptors, precision strike munitions, and maintenance support for systems it has supplied to Ukraine.”

Michael Kofman · Michael Kofman: Is There an Endgame in Ukraine? | Foreign Affairs Interview

Report last updated: Apr 21, 2026

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