Blake Scholl

Founder and CEO of Boom Supersonic, advocating for the return of commercial supersonic flight.

Claims

As speaker

Mentioned in

Key positions and views

The failure of Concorde was economic, not technological, stemming from its government-led, non-commercial origins, which set back supersonic travel for decades.

The U.S. ban on overland supersonic flight (FAR 91.817) was enacted in 1973 as a protectionist measure for Boeing against the European Concorde, not primarily due to noise concerns.

Incumbent aerospace giants like Boeing and Airbus have stagnated for over 20 years, avoiding disruptive innovation like supersonic jets to protect their profitable wide-body aircraft franchises.

Commercially viable supersonic flight is achievable with modern technology and a focus on economics, specifically by targeting the existing business class market with comparable fares.

Developing a custom engine (Symphony) is essential for achieving efficient and 'boomless' supersonic cruise over land, a capability existing off-the-shelf engines lack.

Podcast consensus on Scholl

Points of consensus

▶Both sources feature Scholl's core argument that the Concorde was a government-led prestige project that failed because it ignored commercial economics, setting a negative precedent for supersonic travel.Apr 2026

▶In both appearances, Scholl claims the U.S. ban on supersonic flight over land (enacted in 1973) was a protectionist measure to shield Boeing from the Concorde, rather than a purely environmental or noise-based regulation.Apr 2026

▶Scholl consistently states that major airlines, including United and American, have placed firm orders with non-refundable deposits for the Overture aircraft.Apr 2026

▶The necessity of developing a custom engine (Symphony) to achieve Boom's performance and 'boomless' cruise goals is a key point made across the provided claims after failing to secure a legacy engine partner.Apr 2026

Points of debate

▶The timeline for passenger service is presented with varying specificity; one claim states 'in approximately four years,' while another provides a more detailed goal of 'by the end of 2029.'

▶There are slightly different figures for capital utilization. One claim states Boom has raised $600 million, while another mentions the company has 'consumed approximately $450 million' to reach its current milestones.Apr 2026

▶Scholl's claims about achieving 'boomless' supersonic flight are presented as a reliable demonstration, yet he also predicts the regulation banning overland flight will be reversed, suggesting the technology's regulatory acceptance is not yet secured.Apr 2026

▶The number of airline orders mentioned varies. One claim cites orders from United and American, while another mentions Virgin Group committed to purchasing the first 10 airplanes, and a third focuses on United's specific order of 15 firm plus 35 options.Apr 2026

Key themes

▶Critique of Aerospace Incumbency

Scholl argues that major players like Boeing and Airbus have not launched a truly new aircraft in over two decades. He posits this stagnation is a deliberate business decision to avoid cannibalizing their highly profitable existing wide-body jets, creating a market opening for a disruptor like Boom.

This narrative positions Boom not just as a technological innovator but as a necessary market force challenging a complacent duopoly, which may appeal to investors looking for high-growth, disruptive opportunities.

▶Economic Rectification of Supersonic TravelApr 2026

Scholl's central thesis is that supersonic flight's previous failure was economic, not technological. He repeatedly contrasts the government-funded, economically unviable Concorde with Boom's private, business-class-focused model, which aims for profitability at fares comparable to current subsonic premium travel.

The entire investment case for Boom rests on this premise; analysts must validate the economic model, particularly the claim that a ~$5,000 fare on a 64-seat aircraft can be profitable.

▶Enabling Technology and Regulatory ChangeApr 2026

The development of the custom Symphony engine is presented as the critical technological enabler for efficient and quiet supersonic flight. This technology underpins Scholl's prediction that the federal ban on overland supersonic flight will be overturned, unlocking a much larger market.

Boom's success is dually dependent on its proprietary engine technology and a significant, uncertain regulatory change, representing two major points of risk for investors.

▶Geopolitical Imperative for InnovationApr 2026

Scholl frames Boom's mission within the context of US-China competition, highlighting China's efforts to clone Boeing aircraft and develop its own supersonic plane. He suggests that private sector innovation like Boom is crucial for maintaining America's leadership in aerospace and its industrial base.

By linking his commercial venture to national strategic interests, Scholl may be positioning Boom to receive government support, contracts, or favorable regulatory treatment, potentially de-risking the project.

Source episodes

Timeline

1969

The Concorde, a government-led project, first flies, setting a precedent for supersonic travel that Scholl critiques as economically flawed.

1973

The U.S. government bans supersonic flight over land, a regulation Scholl claims was a protectionist move against Concorde.

c. 2004

The last all-new aircraft designs are launched by Boeing (787) and Airbus (A350), marking the beginning of a period of stagnation Scholl frequently highlights.

Early 2024

Boom Supersonic's XB-1 prototype successfully breaks the sound barrier, marking the first civil supersonic jet development since 1969 and a major milestone for the company.

2025 (Projected)

Boom plans to begin construction of its first full-scale Overture airliner at its North Carolina factory.

2028-2029 (Projected)

Scholl sets a target for the first flight of Overture by the end of 2028, with passenger service commencing by the end of 2029.

Suggested prompts

How viable is Boom's economic model, which relies on achieving profitability with 64 business-class seats at fares of ~$5,000, and what are the key sensitivities? &nearr;What is the realistic probability and timeline for the reversal of Federal Aviation Regulation 91.817, and how dependent is Boom's total addressable market on this change? &nearr;To what extent was Scholl's decision to build a custom engine a strategic masterstroke versus a high-risk necessity forced by incumbent engine manufacturers? &nearr;How credible are Scholl's claims of U.S. industrial base decline and Chinese competition, and to what extent does this narrative influence potential government support or defense contracts for Boom? &nearr;

Key concepts

Boom Supersonic 2 ep Overture Aircraft 2 ep Concorde 2 ep Boeing & Airbus 2 ep Supersonic Flight Regulation 2 ep Symphony Engine 2 ep Airline Economics 2 ep XB-1 Prototype 2 ep Geopolitics & China 1 ep Y Combinator 1 ep

Notable quotes

“[0:03:55 -> 0:03:59] Concord killed supersonic flight. Apollo killed space exploration.”

Blake Scholl · Why Supersonic Flight Failed & How Boom is Bringing it Back

“[0:29:26 -> 0:29:29] Well, this was protecting Boeing from Concord. [0:29:29 -> 0:29:30] So this was 1973.”

Blake Scholl · Why Supersonic Flight Failed & How Boom is Bringing it Back

“[1:25:51 -> 1:26:05] china today is shipping a 737 clone they are working on a 787 clone and they just announced last weekend, the next thing after that, yep, it's a supersonic passenger plane.”

Blake Scholl · Why Supersonic Flight Failed & How Boom is Bringing it Back

“it's the first time that that anybody has reliably demonstrated the ability to fly supersonic without an audible boom.”

Blake Scholl · Meet the Man Who’s Making Supersonic Flight Possible Again | Blake Scholl

Report last updated: Apr 21, 2026

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