Jan Hatzis

Economist at Goldman Sachs

Mentions

Appeared in

Discussed in

Key positions and views

The macroeconomic impact of AI on U.S. GDP and productivity is currently negligible, with investment benefits largely flowing to overseas manufacturers and its potential for job displacement representing a 'black swan' risk [4, 11, 24, 28].

The U.S. is set to operate with a large and sustained fiscal imbalance for the next 5-10 years, which will support near-term growth but exert upward pressure on long-term interest rates [18, 19, 22].

China's economy is successfully navigating its property downturn through a powerful export engine, aided by an undervalued currency, leading to a growing current account surplus that will create significant global imbalances [6, 9, 14, 31].

Major Western central banks are on divergent paths, with the Federal Reserve and Bank of England poised for rate cuts in 2026, while the European Central Bank is expected to remain on hold [3, 20, 21].

Goldman Sachs holds a below-consensus view on U.S. inflation, forecasting a return to near the 2% target by the end of 2026, which underpins their projection for Fed rate cuts [15, 32].

Podcast consensus on Hatzis

Points of consensus

▶Hatzis consistently argues that the economic impact of AI on U.S. GDP and productivity has been negligible thus far, stating its contribution to 2025 GDP growth was 'basically zero' [4, 24].Apr 2026

▶Multiple claims emphasize the significant and sustained U.S. fiscal imbalance, with projections of a federal deficit around 6% of GDP for the next 5-10 years and a direct stimulative effect on growth in early 2026 [19, 22].Apr 2026

▶China's export sector is portrayed as remarkably resilient, achieving near double-digit volume growth in 2025 despite U.S. tariffs, a strength attributed in part to a 'very undervalued' RMB [6, 9].Apr 2026

▶The Goldman Sachs forecast, as presented by Hatzis, is consistently below consensus on U.S. inflation, projecting it will fall from 2.7% to around 2.0-2.1% by the end of 2026 [15, 32].Apr 2026

Points of debate

▶Hatzis presents a nuanced view on tariffs, describing the global economy as 'resilient' to them [1] while also attributing weaker-than-expected U.S. GDP growth in 2025 to their impact and quantifying their contribution to U.S. inflation [2, 25].Apr 2026

▶There is a tension between observed U.S. productivity, which has increased to a 2% annual rate since the pandemic [26], and the assessment that AI's contribution to this productivity growth has been 'negligible' [4].Apr 2026

▶A conflict exists between the expected positive growth impulse from Federal Reserve rate cuts in early 2026 [16] and the simultaneous prediction that sustained U.S. fiscal imbalances will exert 'upward pressure on long-term interest rates' [18].Apr 2026

▶Hatzis highlights a paradox in AI investment: while significant, its contribution to U.S. GDP is offset because the equipment is imported, and some semiconductor investment is not captured in GDP figures at all, creating a disconnect between investment activity and measured economic output [11, 12, 27].Apr 2026

Key themes

▶The AI Paradox: Investment Without Measured ImpactApr 2026

Hatzis argues that despite significant investment in AI, its contribution to U.S. GDP and productivity has been negligible. This is attributed to most AI equipment being imported, which negatively impacts net exports, and accounting rules that classify some semiconductor investments as intermediate inputs rather than final GDP [11, 12, 24].

Analysts should be cautious about equating AI investment headlines with immediate, measurable U.S. economic growth, as the benefits may be accruing to foreign GDPs or are not yet visible in productivity statistics.

▶Navigating a New Tariff RealityApr 2026

The global economy, particularly China, has demonstrated surprising resilience to sharp increases in U.S. tariffs [1, 6]. However, Hatzis quantifies the cost to the U.S. in the form of higher inflation and weaker 2025 growth, even as tariff revenue has surged [2, 5, 25].

The economic impact of tariffs is not a simple narrative; investors must analyze second-order effects like currency valuation and supply chain adaptation, which can mitigate the direct negative consequences.

▶Divergent Monetary Paths of Central BanksApr 2026

Hatzis outlines distinct strategies for major central banks in 2026. The U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of England are both forecast to cut interest rates, while the European Central Bank is expected to remain 'very firmly locked on hold' [3, 20, 21].

This divergence in monetary policy creates potential opportunities in currency and fixed-income markets, as interest rate differentials between the U.S., U.K., and Eurozone are set to widen.

▶Twin Imbalances: U.S. Deficits and Chinese SurplusesApr 2026

Hatzis highlights two major, potentially destabilizing global imbalances. The U.S. is projected to run large, sustained fiscal deficits of 7-8% of GDP, pressuring long-term rates [18, 19], while China's export-driven current account surplus is forecast to grow to an unprecedented 1% of global GDP by the end of the decade [14].

These parallel imbalances suggest a long-term structural tension in the global economy that could lead to increased currency volatility and geopolitical friction over trade and capital flows.

Source episodes

Sentiment over time

Not enough data for timeline

Changes over time

2024-2025

Hatzis notes that the downturn in China's property market was a significant drag on its economy, subtracting two percentage points from GDP growth [31].

2025

Characterized the year as one where the global economy showed resilience to tariffs, but U.S. growth was weaker than forecast due to those same tariffs. AI's contribution to U.S. GDP was assessed as 'basically zero' [1, 24, 25].

H1 2026

Forecasts a boost to the U.S. economy from fiscal policy adding 0.5-0.75 percentage points to GDP growth, alongside Federal Reserve rate cuts penciled in for March and June [3, 22].

End of 2026

Projects U.S. core PCE inflation will fall to 2.1%, the Bank of England's bank rate will be cut to 3%, and the drag from China's property market will lessen to 1.5 percentage points of GDP [20, 31, 32].

Next 5 Years

Predicts U.S. productivity growth will run somewhat above its long-term average of 2% [13].

By End of Decade

Makes a long-term structural prediction that China's current account surplus will grow to an unprecedented 1% of global GDP [14].

Suggested prompts

How does Jan Hatzis reconcile the forecast for U.S. Federal Reserve rate cuts with the simultaneous prediction of sustained, large fiscal deficits putting upward pressure on long-term rates? &nearr;What specific factors underpin the forecast for above-average U.S. productivity growth over the next five years if AI's contribution is currently considered negligible? &nearr;What are the potential global economic and geopolitical consequences if China's current account surplus reaches the projected 1% of global GDP? &nearr;Beyond tariffs, what explains the forecast of China's continued export resilience and market share gains despite its domestic property downturn? &nearr;

Key concepts

U.S. Economy & Inflation 1 ep Artificial Intelligence (AI) Impact 1 ep U.S. Fiscal & Monetary Policy 1 ep China's Economy 1 ep Global Trade & Tariffs 1 ep European Economy & Central Banks 1 ep Productivity Growth 1 ep Global Imbalances 1 ep

Notable quotes

“your point, and I think this is in the forecast as well, is that basically AI investment has been negligible to US GDP growth in 2025. Is that a fair assessment? Yes, basically zero. Basically zero.”

Jan Hatzis · AI, supply chains, and trade resets: The global economy in 2026

“We have two more cuts, 50 basis points. We're currently penciling that in for March and June.”

Jan Hatzis · AI, supply chains, and trade resets: The global economy in 2026

“We're estimating that we'll get to about 1% of global GDP for China's current account surplus by the end of this decade.”

Jan Hatzis · AI, supply chains, and trade resets: The global economy in 2026

“We're still looking at about 6% of GDP federal, about 7% to 8% of GDP for the general government”

Jan Hatzis · AI, supply chains, and trade resets: The global economy in 2026

Report last updated: Apr 21, 2026

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